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Abstract: In 2016, the issue of the Environmental Protection Tax Law indicated the enhancement
of environmental protection in China. This study examines the market reaction to firms in
heavy-polluting industries, and the effects of external legal institutional quality and internal
environmental disclosure on firm value around the passage of Environmental Protection Tax Law.
Using an event study approach coupled with ordinary least square regressions, the researchers find
a significantly negative market reaction to firms in heavy-polluting industries, but this negative reaction
varies depending on the expected increase in future regulatory costs. Specifically, the above negative
reaction is stronger when the firm reveals that itself or its subsidiary belongs to heavy-polluting
industry, however it would be mitigated when a firm is in a region with better quality of legal
institutions or discloses environmental improvement activities. Overall, the results are consistent
with the market perceiving that the environmental protection tax law enacted would increase
regulatory costs for firms in heavy-polluting industries, and also show the higher-quality regional
legal institutions and more efforts on environmental protection could relieve the market’s pessimism
caused by uncertainty.
Keywords: environmental protection tax; market investor response; regulatory costs; environmental
disclosure; regional legal institutions; China
1. Introduction
Public and government attention to the environment are increasing along with the surge in
pollution levels in China since 2013 [1,2]. In order to mitigate environmental and ecological problems
and make China’s pollution under control, the Environmental Protection Tax Law was enacted on
December 25, 2016 at the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s
Congress and has been implemented since January 1, 2018. The shift from the pollutant discharge fee
to environmental protection tax probably increases the regulatory costs (e.g., discharge costs and costs
to deal with environmental issues), defined as “costs incurred by a firm in response to or as a result of
proposed or enacted government regulations” [3].
The literature reveals the effects of regulatory costs on firm value based on predicting the
government’s future environmental regulations after environmental disasters or increasing haze
levels [1,3]. Logically, since environmental accidents or increasing environmental risks, legislative
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reforms would be implemented to create an institutional environmental mandate to encourage business
players to develop sustainably. Blacconiere and Patten confirmed the negative intra-industry reaction
and the positive role of extensive environmental disclosures in firms’ financial reports on the firm value,
based on US chemical firms’ samples [3]. Li et al. reported that Chinese firms providing corporate
social responsibility (CSR) reports and in high polluting industries were relatively shielded from higher
regulatory costs through exploring the market valuation of expected regulatory costs [1]. However,
due to the uncertainty of future regulatory policies, the literature shows the positive effects of CSR
reports but inconsistent reactions for several polluting industries. Based on a certain regulatory policy,
He et al. found out the most sectors in China experience negative market reactions to the passage and
implementation of Environmental Protection Tax Law, and the state ownership influences the market
reactions [4]. However, the literature has not differentiated the market reactions on the passage of
the law and the implementation of the law, and fails to understand the influence of the new tax on
the market reactions conditional on firms’ pollution level and environmental information disclosure
which may heavily influence the market’s prediction for firms’ future regulatory cost. In the context of
the Chinese transitional economy, this study mainly investigates the market’s perception of future
regulatory costs around the passage of the new environmental policy. This study also examines how
this perception varies across firms in industries with different pollution levels, in different regions and
with distinct environmental disclosures. The passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law, as
an external policy, provides us a good opportunity to understand the effects of regulatory costs on firm
value through examining the market reaction to firms at the time the law was passed. In this study,
the authors argue that the stock market would respond more negatively to firms in heavy-polluting
industries since the investors perceive the increase of regulatory costs heavy-polluting firms faced after
the shift from pollutant discharge fees to environmental taxes. In line with this argument, based on
heavy-polluting firms, the authors further argue that the market’s perception for the expected increase
in regulatory costs would vary depending on regional legal institutions and whether firms embrace
environmental information disclosure.
The regional legal quality represents the effectiveness of regulation implementation [5]. The authors
expect that firms located in a region with higher-quality legal institutions are less influenced by this
environmental regulation change. Those firms are viewed as highly compliant players, since the
implementation of discharge fees and other pollutant control regulations should be relatively rigid
in a region with better legal institutions. In addition to legal institutions, the growing concern with
environmental sustainability results in the increasing requirement of environmental information
disclosure [6,7], which is of particular interest to regulators, investors and stakeholders, especially in
emerging markets [8]. The authors argue that firms revealing their heavy-polluting status or disclosing
environmental information are more likely to draw the market’s concern with the increase of regulatory
costs because of the current mandatory environmental reporting requirements in China. However,
the authors also argue that disclosures regarding environmental improvement activities are expected
to moderate the market’s concern with the increase in future regulatory costs.
Using an event study approach combined with ordinary least square regressions, the authors
find a significant, overall negative market reaction to firms in heavy-polluting industries at the time
the tax law passed, and this negative reaction varies depended on regional legal quality and firms’
disclosures of their heavy-polluting status and environmental improvement activities. Specifically,
the negative market reaction was stronger when the firm admitted that itself or its subsidiary belonged
to heavy-polluting industry. However, it could be mitigated by higher-quality regional legal institutions
or the disclosure of environmental improvement activities particularly by a narrative language.
This study seeks to make three main contributions. First, the authors explore market perceptions
of regulatory costs in a unique setting, where the regulations are under transitions and the regional
legal institutions are developed unevenly. Second, in the aspect of regulatory costs, this study enriches
the research on how macro-level policies influence firm value through examining the market reaction to
the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law. Third, our research enhances the understanding
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of the role of environmental information disclosure on firm value. The inconclusive arguments about
the role of environmental information disclosure in previous literature is partly because of the potential
endogeneity problems [6]. It is often difficult to determine which direction is right, “doing well by
doing good” or “doing good while doing well”, since good environmental responsibility and firm
value may support each other. In this case, distinct firm value change came from the variance of
expected regulatory costs for different firms around the law passed. The passage of the Environmental
Protection Law, as an exogenous event, allows us to explore the influence of environmental protection
activities on firm value without the endogeneity problem.
The outline of this paper is organized as follows: the second section introduces the institutional
background in China, followed by the development of research hypotheses based on relevant literature.
After that, this paper outlines our sample and empirical methodology with the analyses of empirical
results. The final section makes the conclusions.
2. Environmental Protection in China
Due to the rapid economic development through industrialization and urbanization, China has
become the world’s second-largest economy since 2010 and the biggest energy-consuming country in
the world [9]. Along with the economic development, environmental pollution is becoming a serious
problem in China, especially air and water pollution. The surge of air pollution increases the days of
heavy pollution and puts one third of Chinese cities struggling with haze issues [10], while the severe
water pollution causes the problem of drinking water scarcity for millions of Chinese citizens [2,11].
In order to mitigate severe environmental problems, the Chinese government has enacted a series
of laws and regulations to handle environmental problems. On the one hand, in order to control
emissions, a set of environment-related laws has been issued in China, such as the Environmental
Protection Tax Law in 2016 by the National People’s Congress [12]. The environmental protection tax
as the first Pigouvian tax in China is used to avert and mitigate negative externalities [13]. Based on
the rule of Pigouvian taxes, this new tax is expected to reduce pollution by charging a price rather than
imposing restrictions directly on the amount of pollution emission. The newly passed environmental
protection tax in general follows the previous system of pollutant discharge fees but differentiates
itself from the fee in the following three aspects. First, the taxes collected are retained at the local level
instead of allocating 10 percent of the fee to the central government as usual. Second, the environmental
protection tax applies different tax rates depending on the level of pollution rather than use a uniform
rate for all polluters. Third, the violating cost for failure to pay is also enhanced by the law, i.e.,
the upper bound for the fine increasing from threefold the amount of tax liability unpaid to fivefold.
In addition, the Chinese government has enacted a set of regulations to enforce and encourage
firms to disclose environmental information. In 2003, the Bulletin on Disclosure of Corporate Environmental
Information announced by the State Administration of Environmental Protection (SAEP, renamed as the
Ministry of Ecology and Environmental in 2018) required firms which discharge pollutants above the levels
specified by governments to disclose environmental-related information annually [12]. In 2008, the
Regulation on Environmental Information Disclosure for Listed Firms issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange
enforced corporate environmental information disclosure for listed firms when itself or its subsidiary
belongs to heavy-polluting industries recognized by the government, and allowed voluntary disclosure
of environmental information for the rest of firms. The Guidelines on Environmental Information Disclosure
for Listed Firms issued by SAEP in 2010 not only enhanced the implementation of previous regulation,
but also required that firms in the selected industrial sectors go through environmental audits and
make their results public if they intend to apply for public listing or refinancing in the stock market.
However, those official rules only provided general guidance rather than detailed ones to generate
variation in transparency and breadth of environmental information disclosures by firms located in
different regions due to the variation in law enforcement by local authorities [14].
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3. Hypotheses
3.1. The Market Reaction to Firms in Heavy-Polluting Industries
Existing literature has investigated whether the change in expected regulatory costs triggers
abnormal market reaction for firms in certain industries. Bowen, Castanias, and Daley [15] and
Hill and Schneeweis [16] reported the negative effect of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident on
the shareholder value of firms in the electric utility industry, while Blacconiere and Patten found
a significant overall negative market reaction for firms in the chemical industry after Union Carbide’s
chemical leak in Bhopal [3]. Based on the increasingly severe haze events in China, Li et al. found
an overall negative market reaction at the time of the haze event [1]. However, they indicate firms in
heavy-polluting industries are relatively shielded from higher regulatory costs evidenced by the same
market response to haze events for firms in polluting and non-polluting industries.
Different from Li et al.’s focus on the uncertain future regulatory costs related to haze, the change
in regulatory costs caused by the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law is relatively easy to
document [1]. The increased regulatory costs vary across firms with different pollution levels. Firms in
heavy-polluting industries suffer from higher pollutant emission costs after tax implementation. On the
one hand, the change in the allocation mechanism by implementing the environmental protection tax
allows local authorities to keep more fiscal income after the new law was enacted. On the other hand,
the application of different tax rates depending on the level of pollutant emission and the increased
violating cost should increase pollutant emission costs for firms to discharge pollutants, in particular
heavy-polluting firms. Hence the newly implemented tax law provides local authorities more pressures
as well as incentives to monitor local firms’ environmental violations and may increase regulatory
costs of firms discharging pollutants. In addition, managers in heavy-polluting firms are most likely to
carry out environmental activities after the law was passed, which will also increase the regulatory
costs. Existing literature suggests environmental activities may increase firm value through improving
a firm’s reputation. However, since the existence of conflicts of interests between managers and
shareholders [17], few environmental activities result in a value increase for firms. The shareholders
hardly know how those environmental activities work due to the information asymmetry. Managers
may use those activities to fulfill their own demands such as building reputation or an environmentally
friendly image of themselves rather than shareholders’ profits [18].
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The market reaction to the passage of Environmental Protection Tax Law is negative for firms in
heavy-polluting industries.
3.2. The Effect of Regional Legal Quality
Although China has made significant efforts in establishing a legal system to control pollution,
the enforcement of environmental laws remains a problem [19]. In addition, China’s administrative
decentralization implemented in the last century decentralizes the control of central government onto
local enterprises and government institutions, which partly results in the uneven development of
regional legal quality [20,21]. The legal institutions, in particular the effectiveness of law enforcement,
varies across regions in China [22,23].
This regional variation in environmental law enforcement is noted in previous literature [24,25],
which finds considerable regional variations in monitoring and punishments of environmental
destruction [24]. Those variations are mainly rooted in the effectiveness of local government
management [25].
Prior to the Environmental Protection Tax, the local Environmental Protection Bureau (EPBs)
monitored and measured the level of pollutants and was responsible for collecting discharge fees.
The local governments directly managed the local EPBs, and sometimes tended to prioritize economic
growth over environmental quality [26,27]. Under low-quality legal institutions, the local authority’s
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power was relatively overwhelmed, and the judicial system was less effective [26]. Specifically, local
EPBs suffered from more serious internal management problems and risk-averse problems (i.e., being
afraid to upset local regulated actors) [28]. The weaker the legal institutions were, the more serious
local environmental law enforcement was undermined, so that previously the tax compliance was
relatively low with low-quality legal institutions [29].
After this reform, local EPBs are only responsible to monitor and evaluate pollutant emissions,
and local Taxation Bureaus guided by both local government and the higher Taxation Bureau are
in charge of environmental tax collection. The change in responsible institutions improves the
compliance cost for firms, particularly for firms with worse tax compliance history. Hence, the market
is likely to respond more negatively to firms located in regions with lower-quality legal institutions
due to the relatively larger increase in expected regulatory costs for those firms. We propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Firms in heavy-polluting industries located in a region with higher-quality legal institutions
generates a less negative market reaction around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law.
3.3. The Effect of The Heavy-Polluting Status Disclosure
According to disclosure requirements by the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, a firm
must state whether it or its subsidiary belongs to heavy-polluting industries in annual financial report
and disclose its environmental information if the firm is in the category of heavy-polluting industries.
However, not all firms expected in heavy-polluting industries reveal their heavy-polluting status as
required. For instance, CSG Holding Co. Ltd. belongs to non-metallic mineral product manufacturing
and construction industries which were recognized as heavy-polluting industries in the 2008 and 2010
Guidelines for Environmental Information Disclosure for Listed Firms. However, in its 2015 financial
report, the firm stated that it did not belong to heavy-polluting industries. Similarly, many firms
should be classified in heavy-polluting industries but had not truly declared their polluting status in
financial reports.
Unlike a developed capital market dominated by institutional investors, the majority of Chinese
investors are individuals with less experience and investment skills [30,31]. Chinese investors might
heavily relay on the superficial information revealed by listed firms rather than deep analysis based on
complex sourced information. Hence, given the idiosyncrasy of the Chinese stock market, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Firms in heavy-polluting industries disclosing its heavy-polluting status in annual reports
generate a more negative market reaction around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law.
3.4. The Effect of Environmental Information Disclosure
The effect of environmental information disclosure on firm performance is, to date, still inconclusive.
Based on the stakeholder theory, one strand of literature suggests that environmental information
disclosure will enhance corporate environmental image and reduce the market’s prediction of future
regulatory costs [3,32]. On the other hand, the competing view based on shareholder theory indicates
environmental protection improvement activities entail costs so that those activities have not created
value or have even hampered the firm value [33,34].
The value of environmental information for investors is to make sure firms would not violate
regulations and suffer from high violation costs. The environmental information disclosure may reduce
the market’s uncertainty about the firm’s future illegal activities. Specifically, the disclosure of detailed
environmental improvement activities would reduce investors’ uncertainty about the firm’s increasing
tax burden and make them believe firms still experience sustainable development without the influence
of increasing environmental protection tax.
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Based on previous studies [35,36], this study explores two types of environmental improvement
information disclosure: symbolic environmental improvement information using a narrative language
and substantive environmental improvement information using quantitative data.
Symbolic environmental improvement information enhances a firm’s social legitimacy [36].
Organizational legitimacy is vital for a firm’s survival and success under conditions of complexity [37].
Recently, harmonious, stable and prosperous development has gradually replaced the sole economic
goals along with improving living conditions, and many new regulations and laws relating to
environmental protection have been enacted [38]. The institutional change is caused by shifts in
the assessment of the legitimacy by a society [39]. As a “symbolic means of inducing cooperation”,
the narrative disclosure about how to improve the ability of environmental protection and pollutant
emission control, is one of the means to secure a firm to enhance its legitimacy among stakeholders
under institutional change [40]. Apart from symbolic environmental improvement information,
substantive environmental improvement information reduces information asymmetry between the
market and a firm [30]. The negative market reaction results from investors’ perception of the increase
in future regulatory costs after the new taxation law was implemented. However, the substantive
environmental improvement information by quantitative data can mitigate the market’s concern about
the increasing emission costs. From the perspectives of legitimacy and information asymmetry, we
propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a. Firms in heavy-polluting industries experience a less negative market reaction around the
passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law if they reveal environmental improvement activities using
a narrative language.
Hypothesis 4b. Firms in heavy-polluting industries experience a less negative market reaction around the
passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law if they reveal environmental improvement activities using
quantitative data.
4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data Source
The researchers combine an event study approach with an ordinary least square regression to
document the market reaction to the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law on December 25th,
2016 and the effect of expected regulatory costs on firm value. The researchers retrieved data from two
sources. The stock trading data and firm-level governance and financial information for A-share listed
firms were collected from the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database [41].
CSMAR, jointly produced by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Shenzhen GTI Financial
Information Limited, is widely used in studies relating to the Chinese context [42,43]. The researchers
hand collected the data about a firm’s heavy-polluting status and other environmental information
from financial, CSR and sustainability reports. Data on the quality of regional legal institutions was
obtained from the National Economic Research Institute’s Provincial Index of Marketization (NERI),
created and updated by Fan, Wang and Zhu [44].
4.2. Sample Selection
In order to examine whether the market responds differently to firms in heavy-polluting and
non-heavy-polluting industries, our initial sample consisted of all Chinese A-share firms listed in
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges on December 25, 2016 after excluding firms without qualified
stock trading data to implement event study. The legislative day (i.e., December 25, 2016) is chosen
rather than the exercise day (i.e., January 1, 2018) because the former day is the formal announcement
day for the enforcement of the Environmental Protection Tax Law which could capture the majority of
the effect on stock prices [45]. Compared with the legislative day, the exercise day may contain little or
no new information because the enforcement of the new tax law has been certain already.
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The researchers selected the sample according to following criteria: (1) excluding firms without
enough stock prices information for event study and (2) excluding the special treatment (ST) listed firms.
Further, the researchers differentiate heavy-polluting firms from non-heavy-polluting firms.
The selection of heavy-polluting firms is based on research by Du et al. [14,46]. According to the most
updated classification of heavy-polluting industries in the Guidelines on Environmental Information
Disclosure for Listed Firms issued by SAEP in 2010, the researchers defined sixteen heavy-polluting
industries (the sixteen heavy-polluting industries cover thermal power, steel, cement, electrolytic
aluminium, coal, metallurgy, chemical, petrochemical, building materials, papermaking, brewing,
pharmaceuticals, fermentation, textiles, leather and mining). Following the Guidelines for the Industry
Classification of Listed Companies (2012 Revision) issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC), the researchers matched defined heavy polluting industries with three-digit industry codes
issued by CSRC. Hence, listed firms with following industry codes are included in the sample of
heavy-polluting firms: mining industries (B06 for coal, B07 for petroleum and natural gas, B08 for
ferrous metal, B09 for non-ferrous metal, B10 for non-metallic mineral), manufacturing industries
(C15 for alcoholic drink and beverage, C17 for textiles, C19 for leather, C22 for papermaking, C25
for coking and nuclear fuel processing, C26 for chemical raw materials and chemical products, C27
for pharmaceuticals, C28 for chemical fiber, C30 for non-metallic mineral products, C31 for ferrous
metal smelting and calendaring, C32 for non-ferrous metal smelting and calendaring, C33 for metal
products), and the thermal production and supply industry (D44).
After sifting through the data, the number of observations used for event study to calculate the
short-term stock-price performance of firms was 2619, including 721 firms in heavy-polluting industries
and 1898 firms in non-heavy-polluting industries.
Since only firms with it or its subsidiary belonging to heavy-polluting industries are enforced to
disclose environmental-related information in reports, this study further explores the effects of regional
institutions and environmental information disclosures on firm value within heavy-polluting firms.
Hence the researchers excluded observations (i.e., firms) in non-heavy-polluting industries and those
with missing data for variables included in regression models. The final sample for cross-sectional
analysis consisted of 650 firms (i.e., observations) in heavy-polluting industries.
4.3. Estimation Period and Market Reaction
The researchers used event study to determine whether and how the market responds differently
to firms in heavy-polluting industries and non-heavy-polluting industries by calculating the short-term
stock-price performance of firms (i.e., the cumulative abnormal return, CAR) around the passage of
the tax law. The CAR around the passage of the tax law is calculated based on a market model.
The researchers first calculated normal return of the stock for each firm by estimating the following
standard market model:
Rit= αi+βiRmt+εit, (1)
where, Rit is the daily rate of return on stock i at time t, Rmt is the equal-weighted daily market return
on Shanghai and Shenzhen markets at time t, αi and βi are parameters with the latter representing the
systematic risk of stock i, εit is the random error term, with E(εit) =0, t is the day measured relative to
the event with t=0. Day 0 should represent the time of the Environmental Protection Tax Law passed,
but the law was passed on Sunday and day 0 has no trading information. Therefore, the researchers
redefined day 0 as the next day after the law passed. A 200-day estimation period from t = −210 to
t = −11 relative to day 0 (where t=0) was applied to estimate parameters. The researchers computed
the abnormal return of the stock i for a given day using ARit as shown below:
ARit= Rit−(α̂i+β̂iRmt), (2)
where α̂i and β̂i are estimates from Equation (1) for firm i. The CAR for each stock i, was calculated by
summing up the abnormal returns over the event window in accordance with the following formula:





where (m, n) represents the event window. The crucial part in the event-study method is the length of
the event window used. This study utilizes a wide range of event windows (−5, −1; −5, 0; −4, 0; −3, 0;
−2, −0; −1, 0; −5, 1; −5, 2) to examine the market reaction.
4.4. Model
Based on the sample of firms in heavy-polluting industries, the paper uses cross-sectional
analysis to investigate the effects of external legal institutions and internal environmental information
disclosure on firm value in the aspect of the market’s perception of expected future regulatory
costs. The researchers use Ordinary Least Square regressions (OLS) and adjust standard errors for
heteroscedasticity by applying the Huber-White sandwich estimators [47,48]. Our main regression
model is specified as follows:
CARs = β0 + β1Regional legal quality + β2Heavy− polluting status+
β3Environmental in f ormation disclosure + β4Controls + ε,
(4)
In order to control the potential effects of outliers, the researchers winsorized all firm-level
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Additionally, to mitigate endogenous problems,
all firm-level independent and control variables were lagged by one year. Moreover, given that the
market reactions might vary across regions and industries, industry fixed effect and region fixed effect
were controlled in this study. Specially, industry effect dummy variables were designed based on
two-digit industry codes of firms, while region effect dummy variables were designed based on seven
different regions in China (i.e., Huanan, Huadong, Huazhong, Huabei, Xinan, Xibei, and Dongbei).
4.5. Variables Measurement
4.5.1. Dependent Variables
The researchers calculated a series of CAR within various event windows, and chose CAR (−5, 0)
as our dependent variable in main regressions to carry out cross-sectional analysis following the
principle that the event window should be short enough to enhance the power of the analysis and
sufficiently long to incorporate the full effect of the event [49]. The Environmental Protection Tax Law
was passed on the last day of the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China held during December 19 to 25, 2016. Since the
conference schedule was made public on the first day of the meeting, December 19 (day −5) and the
first market trading day December 26 (day 0) after the passage of the law were chosen as the beginning
and the end of the event window respectively.
4.5.2. Independent Variables
To examine the effects of regional legal quality, we used Rlegal measured by the legal environmental
index in 2015 from NERI indices to represent the quality of regional legal institutions. For the disclosure
of firm’s heavy-polluting status, we used Heavy-pollutingF, a dummy variable, to measure how
a firm in heavy-polluting industries discloses its heavy-polluting status. The variable equals one
if a firm discloses itself or its subsidiary belongs to heavy-polluting industries in annual reports,
and zero otherwise.
In addition, the researchers tested the effects of the disclosure of environmental improvement
activities in the following ways. Yin et al. classified environmental information disclosure into
symbolic-style disclosure indicating a firm’s environmental strategy and goals by a narrative language,
and substantive-style disclosure reporting quantitative data [36]. Following the definition of Yin et al.,
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this research continued to look at whether the symbolic and substantive disclosure of environmental
improvement activities mitigate the market’s concern with the increasing regulatory costs for the firm.
Symbolic disclosure means the disclosure using subjective information (i.e., textual descriptions and
nonquantitative information), such as ”reduce pollution emission through upgrading machine and
improving producing process”, “take activities to pursue the low carbon economic development ”,
“develop clean energies”, “closely pay attention to the change in the regulations about environment
protection and timely improve the firm’s standards”, “focus on green innovation to pursue sustainable
development”, etc. Substantive disclosure means the disclosure using objective information (i.e.,
the accurate quantitative data). Hence, two dummy variables EimprovementA and EimprovementC were
incorporated in regressions. EimprovementA equals one if a firm describes environmental improvement
activities by a narrative language, and zero otherwise. EimprovementC is equal to one if a firm reported
an accurate amount of environmental improvement cost, and zero otherwise.
4.5.3. Control Variables
Based on prior CSR and environmental information disclosure (EDI) studies [12,28], we controlled
for the following two sets of variables in cross-sectional regressions: (1) firm-level basic characteristics:
Fsize, measured with the logarithmic transformation of the total asset; Fage, measured with the number
of years since a firm’s initial public offering (IPO) as the end of 2016; Tobin’s Q, measured with market
value of the firm divided by the total asset, which indicates growth opportunities for a firm; ROE,
return on equity, measured as net income divided by the total equity; Dratio (the debit ratio), measured
with the ratio of the total liability to the total asset, reflecting the influence of resource constraints.
(2) corporate governance characteristics: Econcentration, measured with the ownership percentage of
the ultimate controlling shareholder reflecting the influence of the controlling shareholder; Idirector,
measured with the ratio of the number of independent directors over the total number of the board
of directors to reflect the quality of corporate governance; SOE, a dummy variable, equaling to one
if the ultimate controlling shareholder of a firm is a government agency or government controlled
state-owned enterprises, and zero otherwise. The industry and region fixed effects were controlled in
this study as well.
5. Results and Discussions
5.1. Sample Statistics and Correlation
Table 1 presents our sample distribution for event study based on the provinces where the listed
firms are registered. All provinces in mainland China are included in this study. In the sample,
Guangdong has the largest number of listed firms, but Zhejiang has the largest number of listed
heavy-polluting firms.
Table 1. Sample distribution by provinces for event study.
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Table 1. Cont.


























Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of the variables used in
cross-sectional analysis. The correlations among variables were relatively low, and the largest and
mean value of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores for all regressions (reported in the last two lines
of Table 4) were far from the cut-off point of 10 indicated by Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, which
alleviate concerns for multicollinearity [50]. In addition, CAR (−5, 0) was generally significantly related
to most control variables (at the 5% level or better), providing assurance that the controls identified
based on prior research are appropriate in explaining the shareholder value. Moreover, Heavy-polluting
firms was negatively and significantly related to the market reaction while Rlegal and EimprovementA
had a positive and significant effect, suggesting that firms disclosing its heavy-polluting status have
inferior market reaction but firms located in regions with higher-quality legal institutions or reporting
detailed improvement activities enjoy superior market reaction. Multivariate regressions in the next
subsections are used to examine whether these preliminary results continue to hold after accounting
for firm-level characteristics.
5.2. The Overall Market Reaction
Table 3 presents the average daily abnormal returns (ARRs) and cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law in terms of polluting character
for different event windows in Panels A and B respectively. In addition, we draw t 1 based on Panel
A to visually show the differences in ARRs and CARs for firms in heavy-polluting industries and
non-heavy-polluting industries.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix for variables in main regressions.
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Plane A: Descriptive statistics
Observation 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Mean −0.006 22.431 12.483 3.343 0.044 0.439 35.9 0.373 0.463 8.25 0.32 0.298 0.332
Sd 0.042 1.315 6.601 2.76 0.297 0.21 17.228 0.053 0.499 4.631 0.467 0.458 0.471
Min −0.208 18.924 1 0.871 −2.205 0.031 0.3 0.25 0 1.33 0 0 0
Max 0.134 28.504 25 28.338 5.713 0.994 89.41 0.6 1 16.19 1 1 1
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix
A: CAR (−5, 0) 1
B: Fsize −0.016 1
C: Fage −0.111 * 0.203 * 1
D: Tobin’s Q −0.022 −0.598 * −0.157 * 1
E: ROE −0.095 * −0.073 * −0.048 * 0.204 * 1
F: Dratio −0.093 * 0.417 * 0.301 * −0.282 * −0.214 * 1
G: Econcertation −0.084 * 0.371 * 0.025 −0.165 * −0.032 * 0.061 * 1
H: Idirector −0.037 * −0.032 * 0.031 * 0.094 * −0.022 0.011 −0.025 1
I: SOE −0.037 * 0.345 * 0.446 * −0.303 * −0.098 * 0.326 * 0.339 * −0.047 * 1
J: Rlegal 0.133 * 0.004 −0.199 * 0.001 0.140 * −0.194 * 0.009 −0.075 * −0.179 * 1
K: Heavy-pollutingF −0.159 * 0.266 * 0.119 * −0.167 * −0.069 * 0.174 * 0.129 * −0.057 * 0.170 * −0.036 * 1
L: EimprovementA 0.140 * 0.341 * 0.162 * −0.222 * −0.021 0.079 * 0.121 * −0.014 0.230 * 0.050 * 0.165 * 1
M: EimprovementC 0.0113 0.111 * 0.085 * −0.157 * −0.124 * 0.186 * −0.014 −0.047 * 0.085 * −0.144 * 0.132 * 0.025 1
Notes: The table reports the basic descriptive statistics and correlation for dependent, independent and control variables in the regressions. The sample size for cross-sectional analysis was
650. Mean and Sd refer to the mean and standard deviation of each variable. *P<0.05.
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Table 3. Average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns.
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns (AARs)







ARRs CARs ARRs CARs ARRs CARs
−7 −0.00029 −0.00029 −0.00123 −0.00123 0.00007 0.00007
−6 −0.00028 −0.00057 −0.00172 −0.00295 0.00027 0.00034
−5 0.00019 −0.00037 0.00103 −0.00192 −0.00012 0.00022
−4 −0.00046 −0.00083 −0.00122 −0.00314 −0.00017 0.00004
−3 −0.00007 −0.00090 −0.00031 −0.00346 0.00003 0.00007
−2 −0.00027 −0.00117 −0.00103 −0.00449 0.00001 0.00008
−1 0.00062 −0.00056 −0.00139 −0.00587 0.00138 0.00146
0 −0.00008 −0.00064 −0.00113 −0.00701 0.00032 0.00178
1 0.00005 −0.00059 0.00068 −0.00633 −0.00019 0.00160
2 −0.00030 −0.00089 0.00074 −0.00559 −0.00070 0.00090
3 0.00013 −0.00075 0.00057 −0.00502 −0.00003 0.00087
4 −0.00053 −0.00128 −0.00026 −0.00528 −0.00063 0.00024
5 −0.00069 −0.00197 −0.00041 −0.00570 −0.00080 −0.00056
6 −0.00002 −0.00200 −0.00058 −0.00628 0.00019 −0.00037













CAR (−5, −1) −0.00292 0.052 0.00112 0.262 −0.00405 −2.166 ** 0.030 0.015
CAR (−5, 0) −0.00406 0.016 0.00144 0.193 −0.00550 −2.656 *** 0.008 0.004
CAR (−4, 0) −0.00509 0.001 0.00156 0.121 −0.00665 −3.503 *** 0.000 0.000
CAR (−3, 0) −0.00386 0.004 0.00174 0.055 −0.00560 −3.324 *** 0.000 0.000
CAR (−2, 0) −0.00355 0.003 0.00171 0.025 −0.00526 −3.643 *** 0.000 0.000
CAR (−1, 0) −0.00252 0.011 0.00170 0.008 −0.00422 −3.527 *** 0.000 0.000
CAR (−5, 1) −0.00338 0.062 0.00125 0.304 −0.00463 −2.038 ** 0.042 0.021
CAR (−5, 2) −0.00264 0.101 0.00056 0.668 −0.00320 −1.751 * 0.080 0.040
CAR (−5, 3) −0.00207 0.290 0.00052 0.709 −0.00259 −1.005 0.315 0.157
CAR (−5, 4) −0.00233 0.274 −0.00010 0.946 −0.00223 −0.801 0.423 0.212
CAR (−5, 5) −0.00275 0.214 −0.00090 0.562 −0.00184 −0.643 0.520 0.260
CAR (−7, 6) −0.00628 0.013 −0.00037 0.829 −0.00590 −1.848 * 0.065 0.032
Notes: The table presents the average daily abnormal returns (ARRs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of
2619 listed firms around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law. Total number of the sample was 2619,
the subsample for firms in heavy-polluting industries covered 721 observations, while the subsample for firms in
non-heavy-polluting industries had 1898 observations. The CARs were calculated using market model regressions
and averaged over each event window. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A of Table 3 and Figure 1 show generally negative AARs for firms in heavy-polluting
industries from seven days before (t =−7) to one day after the passage of the law (t = 0), and continuously
declining CARs for those firms during the day −5 to 0. Panel B reports CARs for subsample firms
for a range of event windows. The mean value of CARs of firms in heavy-polluting industries were
negative for all event windows and statistically significant for most event windows at the 10% level or
above, but the mean values of CARs of firms in non-heavy-polluting industries were generally positive
but insignificant around the law passed. In addition, we applied a t-test for the differences in means of
CARs between firms in heavy-polluting industries and non-heavy-polluting industries. The results
show the differences between two groups were significantly different from zero based on two-tail
p-values for most of the event windows [51]. Specifically, based on a one-tail p-value, the means of
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CARs for firms in heavy-polluting industries were significantly lower than the means of CARs for
firms in non-heavy-polluting industries. All results in Table 3 and Figure 1 support our Hypothesis 1,
which indicates that the market responded much worse to firms in heavy-polluting industries at the
time the Environmental Protection Tax Law passed. Our findings are consistent with previous research
reporting an overall significantly negative intra-industry market reaction to negative environmental
events announcements for firms in certain industries [3]. Our results further explain He et al. (2019)’s
finding that market reactions to Environmental Protection Tax Law vary across sectors [4]. Specifically,
our findings also provide evidence of the significant influence of increasing environmental regulatory
costs on the value of firm in heavy-polluting industries, which opposes Li et al. (2017)’s argument that
firms in heavy-polluting industries would be relatively shielded from higher regulatory costs [1].Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 2  
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Figure 1. The average daily abnormal returns (ARRs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around
the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law in terms of industry character. (a) The vertical
axis is the mean value of ARRs and CARs along with the horizontal timeline t (days), day 0 is the
first trading day after the passage of the law since the law was passed on Sunday. (b) The thick solid
and dashed curves represent the mean value of ARRs and CARs along with t (days) for firms in
heavy-polluting industries respectively, while the thin solid and dashed curves represent the mean
value of ARRs and CARs along with t (days) for firms in non-heavy-polluting industries respectively.
Since only firms in heavy-polluting industries are required to report environmental information,
this study only include heavy-polluting firms in the following cross-sectional analysis by OLS
regressions. Specifically, given the leakage of the information, the researchers used CAR (−5, 0) as the
dependent variable in main regressions and test the sensitivity of our findings by using CAR (−5, −1),
CAR (−5, 1) and CAR (−5, 2) in the robustness check.
5.3. Cross-Sectional Results
Table 4 presents cross-sectional results based on the sample of firms in heavy-polluting industries.
Model 1 shows the coefficient estimates of the baseline regression model including only the
control variables.
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Table 4. Cross-sectional analysis for firms in heavy-polluting industries.
Variables
CAR (-5, 0)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Fsize 0.002 0.002 0.003 * 0.000 0.001
(1.133) (0.892) (1.819) (0.141) (0.570)
Fage −0.001 ** −0.001 ** −0.001 ** −0.001 *** −0.001 **
(−2.484) (−2.247) (−2.410) (−2.708) (−2.442)
Tobin’s Q −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.296) (−0.246) (−0.256) (−0.226) (−0.069)
ROE −0.018 * −0.019 ** −0.019 ** −0.017 * −0.019 **
(−1.856) (−1.976) (−1.980) (−1.770) (−1.967)
Dratio −0.023 ** −0.019 ** −0.021 ** −0.020 ** −0.015
(−2.320) (−1.979) (−2.188) (−1.978) (−1.560)
Econcertation −0.000 ** −0.000 ** −0.000 ** −0.000 ** −0.000 **
(−2.333) (−2.404) (−2.262) (−2.204) (−2.168)
Idirector −0.020 −0.015 −0.026 −0.021 −0.022
(−0.720) (−0.529) (−0.947) (−0.761) (−0.800)
SOE 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004
(1.099) (1.182) (1.283) (0.742) (0.997)
Rlegal 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
(2.918) (2.735)
Heavy-pollutingF −0.016 *** −0.017 ***
(−4.227) (−4.687)




Constant −0.013 −0.012 −0.035 0.021 0.000
(−0.323) (−0.291) (−0.863) (0.518) (0.012)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R-squared 0.071 0.084 0.099 0.093 0.136
Adjusted R-squared 0.046 0.058 0.073 0.066 0.107
F-value 2.203 *** 2.716 *** 2.792 *** 3.159 *** 4.134 ***
Largest VIF 4.24 5.23 4.24 4.25 5.23
Mean VIF 2.02 2.10 1.98 1.95 1.99
Notes: The dependent variable was CAR (-5, 0) in each model. White’s heteroscedasticity t-statistics are given in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on two-tailed tests.
The coefficients on Fage, ROE, Dratio and Econcentration were consistently negative and significant
at the 5% or 10% level, indicating that the investors responded negatively to firms with a shorter listing
period, higher prior performance, more debts and more concentrated ownership structure. The market
expected that firms with the above characteristics may suffer from a larger increase in future regulatory
costs after the new tax law was enacted, consistent with previous studies. Specifically, the market was
concerned the younger firms engaging more in environmental conservation [14], the higher ROE of
firms resulted from illegally reducing tax burden [52], and firms with more concentrated ownership
structure had more incentive to avoid pollutant discharge fees illegally due to the entrenchment
effect [53].
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Model 2 reports the effect of regional legal quality. The coefficient estimate for Rlegal was
significantly positive at the 1% level, providing a strong support to our Hypothesis 2 that the market
has more confidence in heavy-polluting firms located in a province with higher-quality legal institutions.
The explanation may be that the rigorous enforcement of pollutant discharge fees policy and other
environmental laws in those provinces leads to the higher environmental law compliance for local
firms, so that the market predicts the less increase in future regulatory costs for firms located in regions
with better legal institutions after the tax law was enacted.
Model 3 shows whether a firm disclosing its heavy-polluting status influenced the market
reaction. The coefficient estimate of Heavy-pollutingF was significantly negative at the 1% level, strongly
supporting our Hypothesis 3 that firms disclosing its heavy-polluting status triggered a worse market
reaction around the new tax law passed because the market predicts those firms would bear a higher
increase in tax burden due to their heavy-polluting character.
Model 4 provides an analysis pertaining whether and how the disclosure of environmental
improvement information influenced the firm value. The coefficient on EimprovementA was significantly
positive at the 1% level, which supports Hypothesis 4a that the detailed symbolic description for
environmental improvement would lead to superior market reaction. Consistent with our prediction
about the influence of substantive disclosure, the coefficient on EimprovmentC was positive. However,
the coefficient was not significant, only partially supporting our Hypotheses 4b that the disclosure of
accurate environmental improvement investment would lead to a better market reaction. Our results
further provide evidence for Yin et al. (2019)’s argument that the symbolic-style disclosure using
a narrative language contributed more to the firm’s profitability than the substantive-style disclosure
using quantitative data.
Model 5 includes all variables examined in this study and shows that our results were consistent
in the final model. All hypotheses and results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. The summary of hypotheses and results.
Hypotheses Results
Hypothesis 1. The market reaction to the passage of Environmental Protection
Tax Law is negative for firms in heavy-polluting industries.
Supported at the 1 % significant
level in Table 3
Hypothesis 2. Firms in heavy-polluting industries located in a region with
higher-quality legal institutions generates a less negative market reaction around
the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law.
Supported at the 1 % significant
level in Table 4
Hypothesis 3. Firms in heavy-polluting industries disclosing its
heavy-polluting status in annual reports generate a more negative market
reaction around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law.
Supported at the 1 % significant
level in Table 4
Hypothesis 4a. Firms in heavy-polluting industries experience a less negative
market reaction around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law if
they reveal environmental improvement activities using a narrative language.
Supported at the 1 % significant
level in Table 4
Hypothesis 4b. Firms in heavy-polluting industries experience a less negative
market reaction around the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law if
they reveal environmental improvement activities using a quantitative data.
Partially Supported in Table 4
5.4. Robustness Check
Although the independent and control variables are lagged by one year and industry and region
fixed effects are controlled, the researchers used a Hausman test to further ensure there were no
endogeneity problems for independent variables chosen in this study. Based on the results of Hausman
tests, all p-values are not significant even at the 10% level so that the endogeneity would not be
a serious problem for this study. The results are available in Panel A of Table 6.
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Table 6. Robustness check.
Panel A: The results of Hausman test for key variables
Tested variables Chi2 Prob>chi2 Results
Heavy-pollutingF 0.76 1.0000 The variable is exogenous.
EimprovementA 0.06 1.0000 The variable is exogenous.
EimprovementC 3.14 1.0000 The variable is exogenous.
Panel B: Estimating results using CARs based on different event windows
CAR (−5, −1)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Rlegal 0.001 *** 0.001 **
(2.707) (2.547)
Heavy-pollutingF −0.014 *** −0.015 ***
(−4.001) (−4.367)




Constant −0.038 −0.036 −0.056 −0.010 −0.028
(−1.000) (−0.981) (−1.511) (−0.275) (−0.768)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R-squared 0.078 0.089 0.101 0.093 0.130
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.063 0.076 0.066 0.101
F-value 1.932 *** 2.564 *** 2.407 *** 2.520 *** 3.498 ***
CAR (−5, 1)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Rlegal 0.001 ** 0.001 **
(2.255) (2.076)
Heavy-pollutingF −0.017 *** −0.018 ***
(−4.150) (−4.535)




Constant 0.073 0.074 * 0.051 0.107 ** 0.085 *
(1.626) (1.669) (1.158) (2.313) (1.906)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R-squared 0.073 0.081 0.099 0.090 0.127
Adjusted R-squared 0.048 0.054 0.074 0.063 0.10
F-value 2.406 *** 2.745 *** 2.920 *** 3.119 *** 3.746 ***
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 2070 17 of 21
Table 6. Cont.
CAR (−5, 2)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Rlegal 0.001 ** 0.001 **
(2.165) (2.112)
Heavy-pollutingF −0.017 *** −0.019 ***
(−4.108) (−4.524)




Constant 0.097 ** 0.098 ** 0.073 0.129 *** 0.106 **
(2.016) (2.061) (1.562) (2.632) (2.237)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R-squared 0.076 0.084 0.103 0.092 0.130
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.057 0.077 0.065 0.101
F-value 2.778 *** 2.910 *** 3.249 *** 3.328 *** 3.804 ***
Notes: The dependent variables were CAR (−5, −1), CAR (−5, 1) and CAR (−5, 2) in related regressions respectively.
White’s heteroscedasticity t-statistics are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on two-tailed tests.
Additionally, the researchers conducted robustness tests to verify whether our main results still
hold by using CARs within different event windows. In Panel B of Table 6, we used CAR (−5, −1), CAR
(−5, 1) and CAR (−5, 2) to replicate main analyses and find our main results mostly remain unchanged.
All control variables in the main regressions are included but not reported here to conserve space.
The full appendix displaying the results of the robustness check is available upon request.
6. Conclusions
As environmental quality becomes ever-more important for the public, the Chinese government
implements increasingly strict environmental protection regulations. However, there are few studies
to look at how environmental policy change influences firm value. This study examines the value
effects from the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law on heavy-polluting firms as well as
firm- and regional-level influential factors in the aspect of expected future regulatory costs. Consistent
with published literature, this study also finds an overall significantly negative market reaction to
heavy-polluting firms at the time of the tax law passed and provides evidence on the firm value change
resulted from the passage of policies and regulations expected to influence future regulatory costs [1,3].
Given the unique nature of Chinese institutions, this study further investigated whether external
regional legal institutions and internal environmental information disclosure explain the variation in the
market value change of heavy-polluting firms caused by the passage of the Environmental Protection
Tax Law. Consistent with our predictions depending on the market’s perception of the increase in future
regulatory costs, the market reaction was more negative for firms disclosing their heavy-polluting status
or disclosing environmental information without detailed improvement activities, but less negative for
firms located in regions with higher-quality legal institutions or disclosing detailed environmental
improvement information.
Considering the mandatory environmental information disclosure requirements in China,
the market may have viewed firms revealing their heavy-polluting status or disclosing environmental
information in reports as likely to experience a larger increase in regulatory costs to comply with the
Environmental Protection Tax Law [54]. However, reflecting the value of stronger legal institutions,
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more favorable reactions occurred for heavy-polluting firms located in regions with higher-quality
legal institutions, in which local firms have greater compliance with law and may be less influenced by
the enforcement of increasingly stringent environmental regulations. In addition, the environmental
improvement information, in particular symbolic disclosure using a narrative language helps to relieve
the market’s concern with increasing future regulatory costs. Consistent with the Environmental
Protection Tax Law (i.e., the first green tax law) in China focused on discouraging and reducing
environmental pollution [55], it appears that the market finds stronger regional legal institutions and
prior environmental improvement activities to be valuable through reducing the uncertainty of future
regulatory costs in the era of sustainable development.
This study has several implications. First, the findings that expected regulatory costs related
to the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law can affect the shareholder value in China
suggest that market investors should pay attention to social development trends and policy changes
so that they can adjust their investment to follow general trends. For instance, they could switch to
more environmentally-friendly industries and avoid the uncertainty stemming from the increasingly
stringent pollution control by the government. Second, the positive influence of the firm disclosing its
environmental protection by subjective description on the firm value suggest that market investors do
care about firms’ environmental protection value and strategies described by a narrative language.
Therefore, a firm should mitigate the market’s concern with the future regulatory costs resulted from the
increasingly stricter environmental regulations by disclosing detailed environmental information, in
particular narrative information about environmental law compliance and environmental improvement.
The implications of our research should be considered within the confines of the limitations. First,
this study only takes firms in heavy-polluting industries as the sample to investigate the role of external
regional legal quality and internal environmental information disclosure on the firm value around the
passage of Environmental Protection Tax Law. The reason is there are lack of environmental disclosure
data for most firms in non-heavy-polluting industries who are not required to report environmental
information compulsorily. In view of this, future research can collect environmental information
data for non-heavy-polluting firms to understand the influence of voluntary disclosure on firm value.
Second, this study does not apply carbon emissions data to group heavy and non-heavy polluting firms
due to the missing of verified carbon emissions data and the punishment coverage of environmental
protection tax. Further studies can use carbon emissions data at firm level to extend our understanding
of the influence of regulatory costs on firm value.
In closing, the findings are consistent with the notion that the perception of future regulatory costs
will influence the market reaction to environmental events or the enforcement of environmental policies.
Moreover, this research also shows the external regional legal institutions and internal environmental
informal disclosure could influence the market’s perception of the increase in future regulatory costs
around the passage of new laws.
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